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The U.S./EC Relationship: Friends and Competitors
by Murray Weidenbaum
The increasing economic integration of Western Europe resulting from the essential
completion of the EC 1992 agenda is an appropriate time to consider the problems and
potentials of the developing economic relationship between the United States and the European
Community .1

EC-1992 and Beyond
This presentation analyzes the U.S. /EC relationship from admittedly an American point
of view. Let us begin with the ongoing economic unification of Western Europe. To an
economist, the creation of the single market as it unfolds during the 1990s is essentially a
positive event, yet one destined to generate winners and losers on both sides of the Atlantic.
Because the formation of the United States represented in a very real sense the creation of the
original common market, Americans are basically supportive of the community's efforts. We
have been so from the outset, going back to the creation of the original European Coal and
Steel Community, the predecessor to the current European Community.
However, the business and economic relationships among our nations are bound to
become more intricate as we both compete in what is increasingly a global marketplace
involving numerous third- and fourth- parties. It is vital, therefore, that the European
Community and the United States each develop a better understanding of how to be friends and
competitors simultaneously during the years ahead. In that spirit, we must acknowledge that,
from the vantage point of American business firms, the rise of the European Community
presents both threats and opportunities.

Murray Weidenbaum holds the Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professorship and is also
the Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St.
Louis. Research was supported by a grant from the William H. Donner Foundation. This
paper was presented at the conference on "Europe After Maastricht" at Washington University
on October 1, 1993.
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The fundamental positive economic factor flowing from developments in the EC is, of
course, that the 12 countries have been reducing restrictions on business, trade, and labor.
Many of the goals associated with the creation of a single EC market and the integration of
commercial, financial, and cross-border markets were met with the implementation of the EC
1992 program, which in large measure went into effect at the beginning of 1993. Despite some
gaps in implementation, people as well as goods and investments are now able to move much
more readily from one of the common market nations to any other. That is bound to make
Western European businesses more efficient as they achieve greater economies of scale and as
standardization replaces 12 varieties of many products and services. The participation of the
EC as a single entity representing its member states in the multinational GATT tariff
negotiations is another important step in the integration process.
However, the big negative - from the viewpoint of other nations as well as the EC 's
own consumers - is that the trade wall around the EC is not coming down. In the words of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, "Not only did formation of the EC result in a reduction
in restrictions on trade between members, it began the process of setting common trade

restrictions against nonmembers. "2 The contrast between these two very different movements
is quite striking.
Actually, the EC is toughening its external barriers to commerce. Enlightened
economists are not supposed to use pejorative terms such as Fortress Europa, so let us cite
some numbers instead. In 1960, more than 60 percent of the foreign trade of the 12 EC
members was outside of the EC. In 1992, 61 percent of their trade remained in the EC.3 This
is a complete reversal.
The current ratio is bound to rise further for two reasons. The first is the increasing
economic integration of the EC-12. The second force moving in the same direction is the six
countries in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) who are joining in a formal trade
association with the Community to form a European Economic Area. Those six are Austria,
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Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden. For the time being, Switzerland
rejected participating via a national referendum.
Complying with the terms of the European Economic Area will anticipate
approximately two-thirds of the adjustments in national laws necessary for full EC membership.
The trade linkages are already very strong. Austria, for example, purchases 69 percent of its
imports from the EC nations which, in turn, buy 65 percent of its exports.4
Our friends in Brussels tell Americans not to worry about these developments, and that
the EC 's trade restrictions, such as reciprocity and domestic content rules, are aimed at Japan.
However, we do not know how good their aim is. The same restrictions that affect Japan can
keep out goods produced in the United States, whether by domestically owned firms or by
factories in North America which are transplanted from Asia. Moreover, if the products of
Asian rim countries are kept out of Europe, the Western Hemisphere is their major alternate
market. So, in the interconnected global economy which now exists, Americans have a vital
interest in the maintenance of open trading patterns around the world. EC purchasers, whether
family consumers or industrial buyers, likely have very similar interests.
The impacts of greater EC economic unification will surely be uneven, as is expected
of any dynamic process. The most likely winners will include the stronger European
companies with high labor skills and high-tech production capabilities. They will be enjoying
the benefits of both economies of scale and growing domestic markets. These firms also bring
a special understanding of European needs, capabilities, and cultures. Many of these
enterprises should emerge larger and stronger than ever.
In contrast, losers from greater EC economic unification may well include high-cost
European companies that have been sheltered within their own national markets. Some of these
more tradition-bound firms will be hurt by new continent-wide competition. The economically
backward areas- the mezzogiornos- may fall further behind. Of course, not all barriers will
be down. Each member nation continues to possess individual values, needs, cultures,
language - and tax systems. No matter what changes the EC makes, the French are not going
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to make a stampede for German wine. The British will still want cars with steering wheels on
the "wrong" side.
Likely winners will also include many strong U.S. firms with an established presence
in Western Europe. The implications of that presence, it turns out, are ambivalent. The
overwhelming majority of goods sold in the EC by American multinational firms is produced in
the EC by European workers. Only a small fraction of the products sold by American
multinationals in the EC is made in the United States and then shipped to Europe for sale by
their local subsidiaries. 5
The rationale for American firms favoring direct investment in Europe over exports
from the United States was made clear by a representative of Pfizer, the American
pharmaceutical firm:
Pflzer does not have a choice about whether to manufacture in the European
Community or not. If we are going to sell in Europe, we have to manufacture there. 6

Quite a few U.S. -based companies have encountered similar experiences. However,
once established in Western Europe, these enterprises have some special advantages. These
high-tech, well-capitalized companies are accustomed to competing on a continent-wide basis.
They can use one EC country as a base to sell to the other eleven. General Motors and Ford
currently have more Europe-wide strength than such European automakers as Volkswagen,
Fiat, Peugeot, and Renault. The same holds true for computer manufacturers such as IBM,
Digital Equipment, Unisys, and Hewlett Packard compared to their European counterparts.
On the other side of the ledger, quite a few U.S. firms are likely to be losers from the
creation of the single European market. They will fmd it more difficult to export to Western
Europe. Looking beyond the initial adjustment period, U.S. exports to the EC are estimated to
be 2-3 percent lower than they would be in the absence of European integration. 7 U.S.-based
companies also will face tougher competition from the stronger EC businesses in their domestic
markets. The expected losers will include many provincial American companies who have not
yet awakened to developments across the Atlantic.
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On balance, there is a positive thrust to these changes in the economic relationship
between the European Community and the United States. From the viewpoint of the United
States, Western Europe now presents a potential market for a wide range of products and
services far greater than most Americans appreciate - and the benefits should flow in both
directions. The EC is the largest customer of U.S. products and, at least until the most recent
period, its imports from the United States exceed its exports to the United States in most recent
years. Here are a few examples of the ways in which U.S. and EC companies are developing
closer business relationships:
• Ford has agreements with Cosworth in the United Kingdom and Porsche in
Germany for the design and development of car engines used in the models
it produces in Europe.
• IBM purchased minority equity stakes in more than 100 software and
computer service companies in Western Europe between 1990 and 1992.
• Some models of Boeing commercial jet transports use engines made by the
United Kingdom's Rolls-Royce, especially for European airlines. For its
new 777, Boeing has entered into partnerships with Italy's Alenia to produce
the outboard wing flaps and with General Electric of Britain for the primary
flight computers.
• Otis' new elevator, the Elevonic 411, uses electronics designed by its
Germany subsidiary, door systems made by its French branch, and smallgeared components produced by its Spanish division.
• Unisys is simultaneously a customer of, and a supplier to, Switzerland's
BASF, the Netherlands' Philips, and Germany's Siemens - and also
competes with each of these Western European electronics giants.
• Digital Equipment Corporation and Italy's Olivetti & Co. jointly fund and
share the results from Olivetti's research laboratory in Cambridge, England.
• General Electric and Pratt & Whitney are cooperating with Rolls-Royce and
France's SNECMA to develop quieter, more economical, and cleanerburning aircraft engines.
• McDonnell Douglas is working on development of a new radar-equipped
version of the Harrier II (a vertical take-off and landing aircraft) jointly with
Alenia, British Aerospace, and CASA of Spain.
• Pacific Telesis is a 26 percent participant in a joint venture led by
Mannesmann to provide mobile telephone service in Germany. The
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American company also holds a 23 percent stake in Telecel, an international
consortium building a cellular phone system in Portugal.

Not all developments in the EC have been positive, even from a European viewpoint.
Considerable concern has been aroused by the failure of the EC-12 to move more rapidly in
approving and carrying out the Maastricht agreement. In retrospect, the early rush to monetary
union was faster than could be reasonably sustained. Progress surely will be more cautious in
the years ahead but some positive movement may well continue. Individually, many marketoriented economists sympathize with the reluctance of the citizenry to increase the already
substantial power of the EC bureaucracy and of central bankers.
The simultaneous failure of Western Europe to take a forceful stand on the contentious
Bosnia issue also has contributed to a feeling of unease in assessing future progress in the
Community. However, these political setbacks should not deflect from the genuine
accomplishments made in integrating the production, trade, and financial markets of Western
Europe.
Moreover, the EC is a dynamic and not a static concept. The Community started with
six member nations and gradually doubled that number. Twelve will not be the end of the line.
Many other European nations are seeking admission, aside from the special case of East
Germany, which already has been unified with West Germany. As outsiders, we can only
speculate that the applications of Sweden, Finland, and Norway will be approved fairly
expeditiously. Denmark's existing membership is a constant reminder to the other
Scandinavian nations of the benefits of Community membership.
Austria's entrance into the EC would be especially strategic, in view of Vienna being a
major gateway to Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland already have
each signed preliminary protocols with the EC. It is likely that their relationship, at least
initially, will be that of associate members. Slovakia may be a fourth member of that category
and perhaps ultimately joined by one or more of the newly independent Baltic republics.

7

Surely, if the Eastern European nations can get their political and economic acts together, they
could become low-cost suppliers to Western Europe- or competitors- or both.
Now consider the impact of the EC going from 12 members to 15 or 20 or more.
Adding together all those gross domestic products shows that, later in the 1990s, Western (and
Central) Europe will become the world's largest consolidated marketplace and, conceivably,
the center of gravity once again of the international economy. That, in turn, requires us to
analyze, albeit briefly, the key trends in the rest of the international economy.

The Rise of the Other Regional Groupings
The Asian rim economies are growing rapidly and now constitute a very large regional
concentration of economic resources. They are also growing together, although not in a formal
structure such as EC or EFTA. An examination of the substantial flows of investment from
within the Asian rim - especially from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea - to the newer
industrialized nations in the area such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia is instructive.
Most of their investment capital comes, not from Europe or North America, but from Asia
itself. Not too surprisingly, the development of a unified trading area is now taking place in
that part of the world. In some cases- notably Malaysia and Indonesia- Japan has become
their leading trade partner, for exports as well as imports. By 1995, it is likely that Japan will
provide the largest market for the exports and perhaps also the imports of most of the Asian
rim nations.
The other more advanced economies in the Pacific rim - notably South Korea,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong - are also large providers of investment capital and have become key
trading partners for the less economically advanced nations in this region. For example, Hong
Kong and the neighboring Chinese province of Guangdong have generated a very considerable
cross flow of investment; 50,000 managers and professionals commute daily from Hong Kong
to Guangdong. Most of the actual manufacturing activity for Hong Kong-based industries is
now performed on the mainland. In fact, what some observers call the greater "Hong Kong
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enclave" enjoys a gross domestic product approximately that of France and it is growing more
rapidly.8
Economists are not especially enamored of inward-looking regional trading blocs.
Thus, American economists can describe the likely extension of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade
Agreement to include Mexico (NAFTA} as essentially an inevitable response on our part to the
market consolidations that are proceeding so swiftly both in Western Europe and in East Asia.
Surely, it is important to note that, in the case of the EC as well as NAFTA, this process is
essentially a positive one, focusing on reducing barriers to commerce.
Important questions then arise: will regionalization improve the relationship between
the United States and Western Europe or will we go our separate ways? Will regionalization
reduce or increase the volume of world trade? The first question is very judgmental. The
second involves data that are very difficult to interpret. On balance, the continued rise in
regionalization is likely to coincide with the growth in international commerce. However, it
will not be a simple cause and effect relationship. It is another development- the
globalization of business- that will pace the growth of world trade. Continual technological
advance, especially in transportation and communication, will be a far more powerful force
than any static governmentally imposed restraints. Let us explore these relationships.

Regionalization Versus Globalization
It is commonplace to say that France exports wine and Japan sells automobiles to the

United States and that the United States exports jet airliners to both. In truth, though, nations
and governments do little more than record, and tax, those cross-border transactions. It is
private, profit-seeking enterprises that typically engage in international commerce.
Examining foreign trade from this viewpoint provides new insights. For example, in
the case of the larger, more industrialized nations, about one-half of what governments call
foreign trade actually involves cross-border transactions between different parts of the same
company. That ratio holds true for Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. An
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increasingly common occurrence is a domestic firm shipping goods to or receiving items from
an overseas subsidiary - or a foreign firm engaging in similar transactions with its divisions in
other countries.
In a traditional sense, all this is foreign commerce. From an economic viewpoint,
however, these international flows of goods and services are internal transfers within the same
firm. Perhaps the most telling case was cited by former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.
He tells of a shipping label on integrated circuits made by an American firm, which read:
"Made in one or more of the following countries: Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore,
Taiwan, Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines. The exact country of origin is
unknown."
That is the global enterprise in full swing. This incident also illustrates the degree to
which businesses are generating an increasingly more global outlook transcending regional
blocs, no matter how powerful or carefully structured. This broader perspective underlies the
strategies that transnational enterprises employ to respond effectively not only to increased
competition, but also to the inhibiting effects of regionalization.
Here is a rather unusual example of cross-border commerce to illustrate the power of
technology in shaping the strategies of the global enterprise: The day of the Iraqi invasion, the
manager of a Kuwaiti bank faxed the bank's records page by page to his office in Bahrain. He
was forced to stop several times because the gunfire seemed to be coming closer. By day's
end, however, he had successfully sent by fax all of the bank's key documents. Having moved
this vital information, the bank opened for business the next day as a Bahraini institution. Thus
it was not subject to the United States freeze on Kuwaiti assets or to Iraqi control. The bank
literally was transplanted from one nation to another by technology.
Technological progress - especially in the fields of communication and transportation
- makes possible a variety of business innovations that often overcome the obstacles imposed
by governments. Cross-border joint ventures and strategic alliances have moved from the
classroom to the boardroom. They are increasingly common in high-technology industries
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where few companies possess the resources, the technical ability, or the willingness to
undertake on their own the risk of a costly new venture. Electronics companies in Europe,
Asia, and the United States engage in joint ventures to develop new products, and co-produce
existing products. The same firms serve as sources of supply for each other, are customers of
each other - and compete against each other.
There is no set pattern. Partially-owned subsidiaries, associated firms, licensing,
franchising, and correspondent relationships are all increasingly popular ways businesses
respond to changing threats and opportunities in the global marketplace. lmmunex Corp. , a
small biotechnology firm in Seattle, Washington, licenses five products for production and sales
by the giant Swiss firm Roffman-LaRoche. Jiffy Lube, Hertz, Budget Rent-A-Car, Rainbow
International (a carpet dyeing and cleaning company), and Mailboxes Etc. have franchised
many European-based firms to provide the type of services they originally designed for
American customers.
The insurance services firm Alexander and Alexander maintains correspondent
relationships with All Risk of Norway and Aegis Insurance Company of Greece. It also owns
large minority stakes in France's Societe Generale de Courtage d' Assurances and in Ganat
Alexander of Spain. A major portion of Corning Glass' revenues comes from joint ventures
with Germany's Siemens, Switzerland's Ciba-Geigy, and the United Kingdom's Plessey.9
Clearly, technology and business innovation are outpacing traditional political thinking
about international relations. The standard geopolitical map is out of date compared with the
emerging map of business and economics.

An Optimistic Long-Run View
While private enterprise is increasingly global, government policy nevertheless usually
remains very parochial. Understandably, voters still care about the jobs in their country, state,
province, and locality. And politicians are not reluctant to exploit those concerns. However,
when we examine how the public sector deals with economic issues, it is hard to sustain a
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feeling of awe. Take the highly visible subject of EC agricultural subsidies. This is a subject
that has occupied a considerable amount of the time and energy of U.S. and EC trade
negotiators. Yet, it is useful to examine the operation of those supposedly awesome obstacles
to commerce. Here is an excerpt from the 79-page book of instructions published by the UK
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food. This section of the manual, which is supposed to
instruct farmers how to apply for aid under three of the EC's subsidy schemes, has been
described as one of the livelier passages of the book:
If you are claiming only Beef Special Premium and/or Suckler Cow Premium and are
exempted from the stocking density rules, you need not submit an area aid application.
You are exempt from the stocking density rules if your total number of Livestock Units
(LUs) is not more than 15. This total is based on any milk quota you hold on April 1,
1993, sheep on which you have claimed Sheep Annual Premium in 1993, and cattle on
which you are claiming Beef Special Premium or Suckler Cow Premium in 1993.
Further details of the calculation of stocking density and LUs are set out in paragraphs
44 to 57 of the explanatory booklet "CAP Reform in the Beef Sector." You will,
however, need to submit an area aid application if you wish to claim extensification
premium (see paragraphs 58 to 61 of "CAP Reform in the Beef Sector").lO

There is another and ultimately more powerful force that comes into play in
international commerce: the consumers who vote every day of the week, in dollars, guilders,
marks, yen, pounds, francs, and lira. That is a compelling reason to end on an upbeat note
when pondering the future of the international economy in general and of U.S.-EC
relationships in particular.
In each of our nations, the same voters, as consumers, buy products and services made
anywhere in the world. They may vote protectionist, but their daily buying patterns are
oriented to free trade. Consumers in each of our nations give far more weight to price and
quality than to the product's country of origin. Without thinking about it, consumers are
adapting to the global economy. After all, if consumers were not open to the global
marketplace, the pressures on government to restrict international trade would not arise in the
first place.
In the years ahead, the combined power of economic incentives and technological
change will increasingly compel voters and government officials to wake up to the positive
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implications of the global economy. In a basic sense, the mobility of enterprises - of their
people, capital, and information- is reducing the power of government. Public-sector
decision makers increasingly are being forced to understand that they now have to become
internationally competitive in the economic policies they devise. Government programs that
impose costs without compensating benefits or that reduce wealth substantially in the process of
redistributing income undermine the competitive positions of their own domestic enterprises.
The result is either the loss of business to firms located in other nations or the movement of the
domestic company's resources and activities to more hospitable locations.
Political scientists and economists have long since understood and every American
school child is taught that people vote with their feet. They leave regions and nations with
limited opportunity in favor of those that offer a more attractive future. In this era of
computers, telephones, and fax machines, enterprises are far more mobile than that. The fear
of losing economic activity to other parts of the world will surely reshape in fundamental ways
the domestic political agendas of the coming decade.
Therefore, despite the difficulties being encountered by governments negotiating at
GATT, we can be optimistic about future trends of world investment and commerce. Even if
many of those public-sector barriers remain, the private sector will increasingly learn how to
overcome them or even just to live with them. Of course, there are costs involved when
businesses respond to governmental barriers to international business. At times, the costs of
crossing these borders may be very substantial, especially in the short run. However, in a
global economy, these barriers become far from absolute.

Conclusion
The tension between business and government is not new, but the required adjustments
may actually reduce the frictions between governments by bringing closer together the people
and private institutions of each of our nations. The traditional problems of international
relations are being exacerbated by the rapid rate of social, economic, and technological change
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around the globe. But, as a result, the real liberalization of international trade and investment
- and the creation of a truly global marketplace in the years ahead - will be achieved, not
from changes in government policy, but from the competition among firms in the private sector
of the various national and regional economies.
The rapidly changing global marketplace of the 1990s, and likely beyond, will provide
both threat and opportunity for business firms, governments, and consumers. Invariably,
developments such as the achievement of the single market will generate both winners and
losers. The outcomes for specific individuals and organizations will depend in large part on
their ability to understand and to respond effectively to ever-changing economic and
technological trends.
While governments continue to react to the global marketplace with new regional
associations, businesses will keep on trying to overcome or at least to adjust to these barriers
and policies in their relentless effort to meet the needs of their customers.
Looking out toward the twenty-first century, we can readily envision the business firms
and consumers of both North America and Western Europe becoming tied far more closely
together than is the case today. Happily, those alliances and other cooperative relationships
will not be forced by governments. Rather, they will be encouraged by economic opportunities
and technological possibilities. We indeed will learn how simultaneously to be friends and
competitors.
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